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GERMANY: THE AFD’S STAGGERING BETWEEN REASON AND RESISTANCE 
 
Abstract 
This chapter argues that the AfD has not been able to capture the media’s attention and 
display itself as the centre of protest against the government’s COVID-19 policies. One of the key 
reasons is that the AfD has limited its critique to highlighting the failures in prevention and to 
stressing mistakes made in effectively managing the crisis. Consequently, the AfD could not exert 
the same radical critique as for example during the migration crisis. To be sure, the AfD has 
refused to participate in the overall COVID-19 consensus by politicizing the issue. It also tried to 
radicalize its critique by switching from a ‘safety first’ strategy to a strategy of ‘individual rights 
first’. But with no avail. It seems that the party has been suffering from some ‘outbidding’ by forms 
of extra-parliamentary opposition (APO), which are much more radical and in some ways also 
more populist than the AfD itself. 
 




As the first right-wing party entering Parliament at the federal level, the AfD’s aim is to challenge 
the established parties and to signify a rupture of German politics in style and action. The COVID-
19 crisis could have been another boost for the AfD, considering the fact that the party has only 
grown bigger in times of crisis: It emerged from the financial crisis and the widespread critique of 
the EZB’s EURO policy. Furthermore, the AfD had a streak of successful elections in the wake of 
the migration crisis in Germany. However, the AfD does not look like a profiteer from this 
pandemic; and this chapter tries to explain why. This chapter argues that struggles between the 
governments at the federal level (‘Bund’) and at the state level (‘Länder’) have absorbed most of 
the media attention during the early stages of the pandemic, which made it rather difficult for the 
AfD to get its own message out. Moreover, the AfD has been limiting its critique to highlighting the 
government’s failures in prevention and to stressing mistakes made in effectively managing the 
crisis. Consequently, the AfD could not exert the same radical critique (in style and content) as for 
example during the migration crisis. Nevertheless, the AfD has refused to participate in the overall 
COVID-19 consensus by politicizing the issue. Finally, it also tried to radicalize its critique by 
switching from a ‘safety first’ strategy to a strategy of ‘individual rights first’. Nevertheless, it 
seems that the party has been suffering from some ‘outbidding’ by forms of extra-parliamentary 
opposition (APO), which oppose the government’s COVID-19 policies and are much more 
resistant, radical, and in some ways also more populist than the AfD itself. 
 
 
1. Political context  
The result of the 2017 federal elections has had a decisive impact on the political situation in 
Germany. On the one hand, the governing coalition of CDU, Bavarian CSU and SPD has succeeded 
in renewing its alliance. On the other hand, the great coalition between the Christian Democrats and 
the Social Democrats, is also the coalition of the biggest losers of this election. As a result, the 
government does have relatively secure parliamentary majorities, and its room for manoeuvre is de 
facto limited due to internal tensions (especially within the SPD). From the beginning, the breakup 
of the coalition hovered over Merkel's fourth cabinet like a sword of Damocles.  
 
The difficulty in forming a stable government at the federal level did not come as a surprise. The 
election trend at the state level clearly shows that government coalitions in Germany are 
 
 
increasingly based on mathematical majorities, but no longer on ideological agreement between the 
coalition partners. One of the key factors for this development is the end of the two-party 
dominance. The CDU’s future as a catch-all party is unclear; that of the SPD is already history due 
to lack of voter approval. While both parties were able to retain over 80% of votes well into the 
1980s, nowadays the voter’s support is only just over 50% (see table 6.1).  
 
In the wake of these erosion processes, the fragmentation and polarization of the German party 
system has been growing since the re-unification of Germany – a trend that forms the ideal breeding 
ground for the emergence of new parties, especially on the fringes of the party system. Based on the 
Laakso-Taagepera index (Laakso & Taagepera, 1979), the German party system at the federal level 
is now more fragmented than it was in 1949. The governing parties are reacting to this situation by 
redefining their programs and changing personnel, but in both cases without much success. Both 
governing parties currently have no centre of power, which further damages the government's 
ability to act. One exception to this is the Bavarian regional party CSU, which, after its poor 
performance in 2017, has succeeded in repositioning itself under the leadership of Minister 
President Söder.  
 
Table 6.1 Main German political parties (>5% in the last general election) 
Political party General Election 2017 2019 European election  
 Vote shares Seats Vote shares Seats 
In power     
Christian Democrats (CDU) 26,9% 200 22,6% 23 
Christian Democrats in Bavaria (CSU) 6,2% 46 6,3% 6 
Social Democrats (SPD) 20,5% 153 15,8% 16 
In opposition      
Right-Wing Populists (AfD) 12,6% 94 11,0% 11 
Liberals (FDP) 10,7% 80 5,4% 5 
Socialists (Left Party) 9,2% 69 5,5% 5 
Greens (B 90/Die Grünen) 8,9% 67 20,5% 21 
 
The main beneficiaries of the government’s weakness have been the right-wing populists of the 
AfD and, after a disappointing result in the 2017 election, the Greens. On the contrary, the 
Socialists and the Liberals have so far been unable to benefit in a similar fashion. The successes of 
the Greens and the AfD reflect not least an East-West divide, which is also of European relevance 
(Ignazi, 1992), as the recent European elections have shown: The West is becoming ‘greener’ with 
‘green, alternative and liberal’ (GAL) values, while the East is becoming ‘bluer’ favouring 
‘traditional, authoritarian and national’ (TAN) positions. This is particularly true in Germany, the 
once divided country. When the AfD was founded in 2011, it was a Western ‘professor's party’ 
under the leadership of Lucke, rallying against the monetary policy of the EU and against the euro. 
Thereafter the focus shifted more to an Eastern political style under Petry. With this shift in the 
party's base, the ideological core has changed to become more defined by TAN positions 
(Rosenfelder, 2017).  
 
In the Eastern German states, the AfD has now established itself as a strong, if not the strongest, 
opposition party; in the West, however, it still has the character of a fringe party, although it is 
much more strongly represented in the Southwest than in the northern city states of Hamburg and 
Bremen or in the most populous state of North Rhine-Westphalia (Manow, 2018). For the moment, 
the AfD has a no real chance of participating in West-German governments. This was demonstrated 
not least by the Thuringian elections in 2019, in which the liberal candidate was surprisingly elected 
Minister President with the votes of the CDU and AfD, but had to resign after a few days because 
of the general public’s outrage that he has been put into office with the help of right-wing populists. 
 
 
No power in the sense of ‘coalition potential’ (Sartori, 1976) can be ascribed to the AfD. However, 
it has ‘blackmail potential’ since the party has issue-ownership in the policy field of migration and 
can put pressure on right of the centre parties. Moreover, the AfD has considerable influence on the 
arithmetic of government formation.  
 
 
2. COVID-19 diffusion and political measures  
The measures of the German Federal Government and the state governments to contain the spread 
of COVID-19 in Germany can be divided into three phases (pre-COVID-19, spread and 
containment measures, and contagion mitigation). In view of the fact that the outbreak of COVID-
19 in China was officially detected already on December 1, 2019, the pre-COVID-19 phase in 
Germany lasted quite long. On February 26, 2020, the government revaluated the severity of the 
situation: Previously there had been isolated cases of infected persons in Germany, but at that point, 
according to the BMG, it was no longer possible to trace the spread of the infection due to missing 
links in the infection chain.  
 
Figure 6.1 Daily death toll and new cases in Germany 
Source: European Center for Disease Prevention and Control 
Phase 1: pre-Covid-19; Phase 2: spread and containment measures; Phase 3: contagion mitigation 
 
Table 6.2 COVID-19 pandemic in Germany 
Cases 186,525 
Total deaths 8,831 
Total recovered 170,700 
Cases for 1 M pop 2,227 
Deaths for 1 M pop 105 
Source: www.worldometers.info/Coronavirus/ (update 10/6/2020) 
 
The changed assessment of the situation, resulted in a tightening of measures implemented to 
contain the pandemic. While the federal government initially limited itself to measures to educate 
and inform the population, advising to take hygienic precautions (disinfection, hand washing) and 
to keep distance (social distancing); the second phase saw a relatively rapid transition to regulatory 
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assessments. The direct measures to contain COVID-19 were still orchestrated quite uniformly at 
the beginning of the second phase by the German government with the support of the RKI. The RKI 
defined limit values and risk areas and made recommendations for the measures to be taken. Soon 
there was consensus that returnees from risk areas had to undergo a two-week quarantine (starting 
from April 10, 2020); and social distancing also became a general rule of behaviour in Germany. 
Soon, however, a Babylonian babble of voices became apparent as a result of the federal division of 
powers under the German constitution. According to the Constitution, the states and municipalities 
are responsible for interpreting and implementing the necessary measures. Thus Bavaria, as a 
neighbour to Austria, became the forerunner of a particularly strict COVD-19 policy that other 
federal states did not want to follow. And the general obligation to wear a mask was first introduced 
by the city of Jena on April 6, 2020, despite the fact that the infection figures in the whole of 
Thuringia, were well below the federal average. 
 
However, the regulations were not limited to the acute danger of infection but extended to the entire 
economic and cultural life in Germany, bringing it to a ‘lockdown’ (March 16, 2020). Not only 
were mass events, such as the soccer league or music concerts cancelled, but all public institutions 
were closed to visitors, including schools, kindergartens, and universities. Cultural places, bars or 
restaurants were closed. Only ‘systemically relevant’ activities remained accessible, including 
grocery stores, especially supermarkets, and, in some places, drugstores and home improvement 
stores. All retail sales were prohibited unless the very restrictive safety regulations for employees 
were guaranteed. Companies switched to short-time work or to home office. These regulations were 
accompanied by various forms of government economic aid. For example, the short-time work 
allowance was reintroduced, which had already helped to alleviate the problem of unemployment 
during the financial crisis of 2008/2009. In addition, emergency aid measures were offered for the 
first three months to cover operating expenses (e.g. office rent). The fact that this did not include 
the real cost of living has brought criticism of the federal government and the state governments 
involved, which, however, did not resonate too much in the media.  
 
The third phase resulting in a relaxation of the restrictive measures started in Germany on May 6, 
2020. The German government and the state governments agreed on common standards for 
infection control. According to these standards, counties and cities are only obliged to reinstate 
COVID-19 measures if more than 50 new infections per 100,000 inhabitants can be detected within 
seven days. The obligation to wear a mask and to socially distance remain in force. Under these 
conditions, not only companies and stores can reopen, but also public institutions, provided that the 
organizers can present an appropriate hygiene concept. This has contributed to a considerable 
normalization of life, allowing schools and kindergartens to reopen. In addition, cultural and 
sporting events are allowed to take place again, provided that government guidelines can be upheld.  
 
In addition to the regulatory measures, government action was also characterized by several 
structural measures aimed at protecting the healthcare system from possible overburdening by 
COVID-19 patients. By the end of the first phase, the BMG had already initiated the massive 
purchase of protective clothing (PPE), particularly masks. At the beginning of the second phase, 
government regulations and initiatives were intended to increase the supply resources in hospitals, 
with a particular focus on the capacity of intensive care beds (ICB). As a result, these capacities 
were never exhausted in Germany at any time (the percentage of free ICB was never less than 34% 
during the time from April 16 to June 30). On the contrary, individual German states have made 
their resources available for the reception of COVID-19 patients from France and Italy. For some 
time now, however, the question has been investigated, initiated by some media reports, whether 




Despite the fact that the health care system has passed the acid test for the time being, the pandemic 
has resulted in a considerable slump of the German economy. Forecasts unanimously expect 
considerable growth in 2021. However, it is highly questionable whether it will be able to 
compensate for the decrease of more than 6 percent in 2020. The same is applicable to the medium-
term effects of the COVID-19 crisis on the German economy, which is still heavily dependent on 
exports. Indeed, there are clear signs of job loss and a shrinking of future opportunities for 
Generation Z, which is likely to be only marginally prepared for this challenged economy.  
 
 
3. Populist discourse at the time of COVID-19  
It is commonplace that times of crisis favour the government. It is able to act while the opposition 
can only stand by and watch. In such situations, consensus-oriented cooperation often imposes itself 
as an opposition strategy to prove that the government is aware of its responsibilities. All parties, 
except for the AfD, adopted such an attitude during the COVD-19 crisis. For the AfD, the pandemic 
is proof of the incapacity of the country's elites. According to the AfD, the government’s incapacity 
has three reasons (Stefan Keuter, 07/05/2020).33  
 
First, the government under Merkel's leadership has not been able to recognize the challenge of the 
pandemic in time (e.g. Weidel, 04/03/2020), although the Coronavirus has long been acknowledged 
as a pandemic threat (Kraft, 12/02/2020). Secondly, it has failed to take precautions for 
emergencies, and instead, with its eyes wide open, has foolishly relied on foreign countries (e.g. 
Spangenberg, 12/02/2020), in particular China (Keinwächter, 13/03/2020) and the WHO (Oehme, 
28/05/2020). Thirdly, the government's crisis management lacks any sense of proportion, because it 
presents the lockdown as the only possible solution (Komning, 14/05/2020), but ignores the harsh 
consequences for the people (Keuter, 07/05/2020) and the economy (Hilse, 18/06/2020). 
 
Although there are voices within the AfD calling for constructive cooperation in view of the crisis 
(Pohl, 25/03/2020) – even from prominent figures such as Alice Weidel (04/03/2020), the co-chair 
of the AfD parliamentary group in the German Bundestag – they remain isolated. Instead, they 
portray themselves as the only ‘alternative’ to the pandemic consensus of the other parties and as a 
true oppositional force for whom the topic of COVID-19 is not only a top priority (Robby Schlund, 
12/02/2020), but who also fights to ensure that families are heard as the real sufferers of the 
pandemic (Reichardt, 22/04/2020). This issue has been hammered away since March (e.g. 
Kleinwächter, 28/05/2020). The AfD is now demanding unrestricted solidarity for families, 
financially (Pohl, 25/03/2020) and organizationally, i.e. by reopening schools and kindergartens as 
soon as possible (Schlund, 22/04/2020). 
 
Moreover, the family support is also used as a cipher for taking care of the people – the German 
people (Hampel, 11/03/2020). Accordingly, in the international race for the vaccine, it is essential 
to protect the German people (Gauland, 25/03/2020), always according to the motto: ‘Germany 
first, Germany first’ (Müller, 23/4/2020). For the crisis now reveals what the other parties could not 
see or admit (Harald Weyel, 23/4/2020), namely that only the nation state has the necessary 
capacity to act, but not the EU. European cooperation can complement national politics, but it 
cannot replace it, because it is unable to represent German interests (Gauland, 25/03/2020). In the 
opinion of the AfD, it is simply not in Germany's interest to see the pandemic as an opportunity for 
European solidarity, let alone for deepening the European economic and financial integration via 
‘Corona bonds’ (Boehringer, 25/03/2020). Even the admission of intensive care patients from 
neighbouring countries, which has been understood and endorsed by many in public discourse as a 
symbolic gesture, must be kept within limits according to the AfD (Spangenberg, 07/05/2020). 
 
33 All mentions in sections 3 and 4 are coming from the Bundestag debates (‘Plenarprotokolle’). Due to place limitation, 




In the AfD’s opinion, the inability of the other parties to draw boundaries is one of the fundamental 
evils of German politics, which has been particularly evident in migration policy. Now the 
government is prone to make the same mistakes again: For instance, why are German countrymen 
not allowed to travel to the German coasts, while refugees are allowed into the country without 
quarantine (Hemmelgarn, 13/05/2020)? Further, why should Germany pay ‘the many billions for 
the asylum industry’, when its public finances will be under considerable strain for the foreseeable 
future as a result of the COVID-19 crisis? (Jacobi, 25/03/2020). Finally, when will the German 
government learn the lessons from the migration crisis and invest more in efficient border 
protection, which also provides the means to protect the German people against an import of 
COVID-19 (Kleinwächter, 11/03/2020)?  
 
In short, according to the AfD’s interpretation, the government is incapable. This is the unanimous 
verdict within the AfD. And one of the decisive reasons for this, in their view, is that the 
government cannot think in genuinely political categories: national identity and national interest. 
Instead, it follows scientific suggestions; and tries to hide the fact that its COVID-19 policies, like 
all political decisions, create ‘winners and losers’ as a result. The partner in crime is the media. As 
it has been before, the so-called mainstream media are the real scapegoats in this pandemic, 
according to the AfD, because they systematically suppress necessary criticism of the government 
(Reichardt, 07/05/2020) or stigmatize dissenting opinions, especially those of the AfD, portraying 
them as conspiracy theorists, Corona-deniers, or ‘Covidiots’ (Komning, 14/05/2020). Occasionally, 
however, these attacks have been self-inflicted by murmuring coming from the AfD about the Bill 
and Melinda Gates Foundation and its influence on COVID-19 (e.g. Braun, 15/05/2020). 
 
Against this background, it is obvious that the AfD is seeking to establish a link to the 
demonstrations against the state's COVID-19 policy that have started in May 2020 immediately in 
the wake of the loosening of restrictions. The AfD welcomes these events as civil rights protest (e.g. 
Sichert, 14/05/2020). However, these protests also show very clearly the limited political impact of 
the AfD during the Corona crisis. For the party is not able to bind or even channel the protests. In 
fact, it seems to chase the protesters rather than leading them.  
 
 
4. The politicization of COVID-19 issue by populists  
Since the beginning of the crisis, the German government has been striving to achieve the broadest 
possible acceptance for its COVID-19 policy. This goal was served by the involvement of the RKI 
as scientific authority as well as close and consensus-oriented coordination with the governments of 
the federal states. Both elements can be understood as a strategy of depoliticization. This strategy 
must be seen in large parts as failed. Because up to the present day, the scope and orientation of the 
COVID-19 policy is still being debated. The main line of conflict, widely covered by the media, 
runs between the following positions: one side advocates nationwide uniform standards and 
typically also advocates more rigid protective measures (‘safety first’). The other side advocates a 
targeted response to acute infections and emphasizes the need for proportionality in dealing with 
measures that restrict freedom (‘individual rights first’). This conflict runs right through the parties, 
especially in the CDU (‘intra-partisan conflict’); it also divides the governments between the Bund 
and some of the Länder (‘intergovernmental conflict’) and reflects to some extent the East-West-
difference, because it is primarily East German politicians who, due to the small number of 
COVID-19 cases in their states, are against rigid pandemic policies. 
 
The intergovernmental conflict in particular has consequences for the AfD: First, the 
intergovernmental line of conflict has led to a kind of permanent politicization of the pandemic, 
which became even more entrenched after Easter with the increasing replacement of the federal 
 
 
government’s leadership role by the Länder. This form of intergovernmental politicization of the 
pandemic has left little room for the opposition to present itself, and the AfD in particular has 
hardly had a chance to distinguish itself in the concert of media attention. In addition, the AfD’s 
centre of power is located in the eastern part of the republic, but the two prime ministers of Saxony 
and Saxony-Anhalt have already been able to successfully present themselves in the media as critics 
of the federal government.  
 
Initially, the AfD’s politicization strategy was strongly aimed at accusing the federal government of 
incompetence in prevention and crisis management. With this focus of criticism, however, a 
preliminary decision had already been made on the status of COVID-19: The pandemic is real, as is 
the virus. Whereas many populists seem to question the biological existence of Corona, the AfD has 
not been challenging the main elements of the government’s COVID-19 narrative. The naming and 
blaming is therefore only directed toward the management by the government. This led to a path 
dependency of the argumentation, which basically opened up little scope for castigating the 
emergence of the virus or the pandemic itself as a political problem; for example, as exaggeration 
on the part of the government or through conspiracy theories. For the AfD as an opposition, a 
confrontation with the state’s COVID-19 policy was only possible within the government’s 
narrative of what was necessary, which meant that the criticism lacked clout. For clout is gained 
through the ‘pros and cons’ of positions (salience) and not through a ‘more or less’ within a position 
(valence).  
 
This open field of criticism of government policy has been occupied by actors of the civil society 
that apparently pursues the goal of aggregating the growing dissatisfaction and transforming it into 
a protest movement, possibly a political party. One of these attempts, called ‘Resistance 2020,’ 
became a non-starter. However, this example illustrates the growing willingness of the COVID-19 
‘losers’ (the retail trade, the solo self-employed and artists, etc.) to demonstrate together with the 
‘system opposition’, i.e. the radical left and extreme right. Not only does a radical refusal to comply 
with COVID-19 regulations take place in these circles, e.g. in the form of ‘Corona parties.’ This 
consensus of non-compliance is also the breeding ground for ‘alternative’ narratives on the origins 
of the virus and its spread. Due to the path dependency of its own argumentation, the AfD has so far 
not been able to establish a sustainable connection to these forms of protest within the civil society. 
 
Such a lasting connection would require a form of naming and blaming that AfD has not been 
willing to do so far. With regard to prevention, it demands greater independence for Germany in 
production of drugs and protective equipment and greater consideration for of ‘national interests’; 
and with regard to the COVID-19 restrictions, it advocates a more family-friendly and economy-
supportive approach. If the AfD, for example, refers to British studies on the risk of childhood 
infection in support of a more family-friendly approach, it does not question the scientific basis of 
COVID-19 in principle, but is instead affirming science-orientation as a basis for the debate. It is no 
wonder that this kind of claiming makes little impression on all those who think COVID-19 is a 
product of governmental fear politics or simply fake. Against this background, it does not come as a 
surprise that the AfD has changed its position – a strategy that aims at regaining the status as the 
‘true alternative’ to government. It no longer belongs to the camp of the ‘safety first’ supporters, but 
to the ‘individual rights first’ representatives. It is no longer focused on the right measures to 
protect the population during the crisis, but on the ‘Corona measures crisis’ (Höchst, 29/05/2020), 
or simply on the ‘lockdown crisis’ (e.g. Protschka, 13/05/2020).  
 
In the eyes of AfD politicians, this was a reflex to the state's Corona policy (Spangenberg, 
23/04/2020). However, there can be no doubt that the change of position within the AfD itself took 
place relatively quickly. For example, the co-chair of the parliamentary group Weidel characterized 
the situation on March 4 in the German Bundestag with the sentence: ‘We are at the beginning of a 
 
 
Corona epidemic’ (Weidel, 04/03/2020). A good week later, MP Holm swore that the Germans 
have to come together in the crisis (Holm, 13/03/2020). And his colleague Hess added concrete 
demands, including the immediate nationwide closure of all schools and public institutions, a ban 
on entry of people from high-risk areas and the cancellation of mass events. ‘Anyone who does not 
act decisively now,’ said Hess (13/30/2020), ‘increases the probability that the crisis will get out of 
control, as it did in Italy.’  
 
After the Bund and Länder agreed on March 22 on strict COVID-19 measures, the AfD 
immediately began to change its position towards ‘individual rights first.’ ‘What alternatives are 
there to the current course?’ Gauland (25/03/2020), co-chair of the parliamentary group of the 
AfD, linked his question with the demand for a time limit on protective measures, and argued that 
the government’s policies are excessive and economically damaging. This set the tone for others: In 
the long run, Jongen said, these measures can neither be financed nor sustained, especially since 
they ignore the social costs of such crisis management (e.g., 22/04/2020). Therefore, back to 
normality – the faster, the better (e.g. v. Storch, 07/05/2020). From May onwards, this position was 
enriched with accusations that the government exploits the COVID-19 measures to pursue other 
purposes: the desire to distract from past failures (e.g. Hemmelgarn, 13/05/2020); the effort to 
expand governmental power (Wolfgang Wiehle, 15/05/2020); the plan to push through socialist 
utopias (Huber, 19/06/2020) or a sell-out of the country (Kotré, 27/05/2020)  
 
Especially the accusations against the government of panic-mongering (e.g. Kotré, 06/05/2020), in 
order to incapacitate citizens (e.g. Witt, 02/07/2020), were suitable to join the new-APO against the 
government’s COVID-19 policies. So far, the response to this politicization strategy has had no 
discernible effect. The AfD is not among the winners of the COVID-19 crisis in public opinion 
(https://www.wahlrecht.de/umfragen/index.htm): To the extent that state institutions, especially the 
government, have gained in confidence (Forsa, 02/09/2020), the survey results for the AfD are 
relatively meagre during the pandemic so far.  
 
 
5. Conclusion  
During the past crises, especially during the high time of migration in 2015, the AfD was perceived 
as the 'true opposition' by many of those who were dissatisfied with the migration and integration 
policies of the German government. The party succeeded in attracting and mobilizing voters 
(Geiges 2018), compared to the CSU, because its criticism was always harsher and more extreme in 
rhetoric and demands than that of other critics. In this polarized field of migration policy this kind 
of radical approach helped in ‘outbidding’ the CSU and others because large parts of the citizenry 
viewed the AfD’s performance as authentic and gave the party credit for it, particularly in the 
eastern parts of Germany. The COVID-19 crisis is different for two reasons. 
First, the AfD itself became a victim of ‘outbidding’ by the APO, since the 'real opposition' takes 
place outside of parliament in the streets at 'Corona parties' and demonstrations in which many 
participants are not only criticizing, but resisting the government’s Corona policies. Compared to 
this amount of resistance, the AfD appears to be part of the establishment due to its 'safety first' 
logic of naming, blaming and claiming in the beginning of the pandemic in Germany, which largely 
stayed within the government’s narrative of the COVID-19 pandemic.  
Second, the AfD failed to get the media’s attention. In the early phase of the emergence of the 
pandemic in Germany this attention was absorbed by the intergovernmental conflict between the 
different government’s Corona positions and policies. Now the media focus has shifted to the non-
compliance of the Corona-APO with whom the AfD tries to connect, but without much success in 
terms of the limelight. However, this can change again relatively quickly, namely if the AfD 
succeeds in establishing a linkage between the government’s Corona policy and the issue of 
migration (as for the attempts on part of the AfD). The other parties have so far been unable to find 
 
 
a recipe against the AfD's winning theme of migration. The COVID-19 pandemic may have only 
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